This is Democracy? Problems with Electronic Voting Machines

R. Scott Granneman

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
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.

Chief Justice Earl Warren Reynolds v. Sims (1964)











"I'd like the paper ballot, please."



Voting

A voting system has 4 required characteristics

- 1. Accuracy
- 2. Anonymity
- 3. Scalability
- 4. Speed




George Caleb Bingham's (1811–1879) is one of the greatest American painters of the 19th century


Self-Portrait of the Artist, 1834–35





Born 1811 in Augusta County, VA


Family moved to Franklin, MO in 1819




















George Caleb Bingham's *The County Election* (1852) shows Election Day in 1850 on the main street of a town in Saline County, Missouri















Systems

5 kinds in use

- » Paper ballots
- » Lever machines
- » Punch cards
- » Optical scan
- » DRE (Direct Recording Electronic)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OFFICIAL BALLOT

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION—NOVEMBER 3, 1964

Place a mark in the box beside the names of the candidates for whom you wish to vote.



Republican

BARRY GOLDWATER, President, and WILLIAM E. MILLER, Vice-President



Democratic

LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President, and HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Vice-President

Fold Here before leaving voting booth. **VOTE ALL BALLOTS**

AMENDMENT & RETENTION BALLOTS ->

REGULAR CANDIDATE BALLOT 1

AUTOMATIC VOTING MACHINE CORP. JAMESTOWN, N.Y. INSTRUCTION MODEL NO. 23850

2 NO

CC

2 YES

BOARD OF EDUCATION BOND ISSUE

Shall bonds be issued by the Board of Education of the City of Cl. ago for the purpose of erecting, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring bldg, sui able for school houses, erecting temporary school structures, recting additions to, repairing, rehabilitating and modernizing.

4 FOR 4 AGAINST Question 1

Shall plan C for increasing City water supply be approved?

5 YES 5 NO Question 2

Shall a speed limit of 30 .ailes per hour be approved?

PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Vote for One)

I A Henry W.

Candidate

Edward X.

Candidate

UNITED STATES SENATOR (Vote for One)

TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS (Vote for Three)

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 30th Cong. Dist. (Vote for One)

STATE SENATOR 50th Leg. Dist. (Vote for One) 9 10

REPUBLICAN

EMOCR.

2 A

Robert J. Candidate

3 A

Walter X. Candidate

4A

Jerome A Candidate

5 A Pamela P. Candidate

5 B

Harold A. Candidate

6 A

7 A Lorenzo D. Candidate 9 A

10 A

1 VOTE 11/2 VOTES Philip D. Candida

1 B John C. Candidate Wayne W. Candidate 2 B

Alex P. Candidate

3 B

Hazel V. Candidate

4 B Ned S.

Nathanial S. Candidate Candidate 6 B

Wendy G. Candidate 7 B

Hiram Q. Candidate 9 B

10 B

1 VOTE

11/2 VOTES

Vernon D. Candida

(REPUBLICAN)

(NATURAL LAW)

13->

OFFICIAL BALLOT, GENERAL ELECTION PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA NOVEMBER 7, 2000

ELECTORS FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT (A vote for the candidates will ually be a vote for their electors.) (Vote for Group)	(DEMOCRATIC) AL GORE - PRESIDENT JOE LIEBERMAN - VICE PRESIDENT	5->
	(LIBERTARIAN) HARRY BROWNE - PRESIDENT ART OLIVIER - VICE PRESIDENT	7>>
	(GREEN) RALPH NADER - PRESIDENT WINONA LADUKE - VICE PRESIDENT	9->
	(SOCIALIST WORKERS) JAMES HARRIS - PRESIDENT MARGARET TROWE - VICE PRESIDENT	11>>

JOHN HAGELIN PRESIDENT

NAT GOLDHABER - VICE PRESIDENT

GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENT

DICK CHENEY - VICE PRESIDENT

100	(REFORM)
≪ 4	PAT BUCHANAN - PRESIDENT
	EZOLA FOSTER - VICE PRESIDENT
	(SOCIALIST)
← 6	DAVID MCREYNOLDS PRESIDENT
	MARY CAL HOLLIS - VICE PRESIDENT
	(CONSTITUTION)
₹ 8	HOWARD PHILLIPS - PRESIDENT
	J. CURTIS FRAZIER - VICE PRESIDENT
	(WORKERS WORLD)
€10	MONICA MOOREHEAD - PRESIDENT
	GLORIA La RIVA - VICE PRESIDENT
	WRITE-IN CANDIDATE
	To vote for a write-in candidate, follow the
	directions on the long stub of your ballot card







"Simply put, many computer scientists doubt that paperless DREs [Direct Recording Electronics] can be made reliable and secure, and they expect that any failures of such systems would likely go undetected."

—Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, & Edward W. Felten, Princeton University

Companies





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Global Election Systems, Inc. (GES)
Bought by Diebold (2002 • $24.7 million)
Changes name to Premier Election Solutions (2007)
Bought by ES&S (September 2009 • $5 million)
Bought by Dominion Voting Systems (May 2010 • $?)
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2012

Hart Intercivic is in:

- » all 234 counties of Texas
- » entire states of Hawaii & Oklahoma
- » half of Washington & Colorado
- » certain counties in Ohio

2014

ES&S is in 4,500 localities with 60+% market share

260,000+ voting systems

75,000+ elections

Examples

Volusia County, FL 2000 Diebold

Al Gore gets –16,022 votes

San Bernardino County, CA 2001


Programming error causes computers to look for votes in the wrong place on a ballot in 33 local elections

No votes registered for those ballots




Boone County, IA 2003

140,000 votes counted on machines



Boone County, IA 2003

50,000 people live there



Boone County, IA 2003

25,000 eligible to vote

Palm Beach County, FL 2004

Audits of voting machine logs reveal more than 100,000 errors

- » Timestamps of 2010
- » Cards stuck or misread
- » Powering down (128 times!)
- » "Unknown event" messages
- » & many others

Sarasota County, Florida 2006 ES&S

18,000 ballots showed no vote cast for the 13th Congressional District

Undervote rate was 5 times normal

100s of voters complained that day

Race lost by 400 votes

Jacksonville, FL 2008

"We're having problems with the poll machines," a voter in Jacksonville, Florida, told the CNN Voter Hotline. "They're not aligned correctly, so you're not sure about which candidate you're voting for..."

"... machines at several locations refused to record the ballots."

Jackson County, West Virginia 2008 ES&S

"I went in there and pushed the Democrat ticket, and it jumped to the Republican ticket for president of the United States,' said Calvin Thomas, an 81-year-old West Virginian. ... The same thing happened to his daughter, Micki Clendenin, when she cast her ballot."

TOUCH SCREEN VOTE FLIPPING Jackson County, West Virginia October 23rd, 2008



Jackson County, West Virginia 2008 ES&S

TOUCH SCREEN VOTE FLIPPING Jackson County, West Virginia October 23rd, 2008



Jackson County, West Virginia 2008 ES&S

Decatur County, TN 2008 ES&S

3 voters complain they voted for McCain & a vote for Obama was registered


"Voters who are too tall don't have a good view of the ballot and might think they're touching the center of the box when they're not." Mineral Wells, TX
2008
ES&S

Voters report machines switch straight-party vote from Democratic to Republican



Rapid City, South Dakota June 2009 ES&S

10,488 votes counted



Rapid City, South Dakota
June 2009
ES&S

Of those, 4,875 were phantom votes

2012

Virginia, Florida, Pennsylvania, Colorado, & other states used DRE machines that lacked any paper backup for later recount

New York, NY 2012

1% of all votes in 13th Congressional District were never counted

Charles Rangel wins by a 2% margin

New York Daily News: "It defies logic that 514 people went to the polls in this hotly-contested race and voted for no one."


Greensboro, North Carolina 2012 ES&S

A voter tries to vote for Romney, but the machine chooses Obama 3 times


Other voters report similar problems

St. Louis
2012

Voter votes for Obama but a vote for Romney is cast



Perry County, Pennsylvania 2112 ES&S



Perry County, Pennsylvania 2112 ES&S

Diebold

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Alterations Without Notifications

Georgia, 2002

Diebold changes machines' software 8 times without the state examining it

6 electoral upsets, including the incumbent senator, ahead in the polls, who loses by 11 points

After the election, Diebold overwrites the flash memory on all machines' cards

Alameda County, CA November 2003

Diebold alters software on machines prior to the elections without submitting software for testing or notifying the state about the updates

From the Horse's Mouth

March 2003

Someone breaks into a Diebold website & copies 1000s of messages from an internal discussion board

The messages & source code are provided to journalists & posted on college websites

1: January 18, 2001

"I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the County. I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was uploaded. ... I would appreciate an explanation on why the memory cards start giving check sum messages. We had this happen in several precincts..."

2: October 5, 2001

"Over [the past three years] I have become increasingly concerned about the apparent lack of concern over the practice of writing contracts to provide products and services which do not exist and then attempting to build these items on an unreasonable timetable with no written plan, little to no time for testing, and minimal resources. ... It also seems to be an accepted practice to exaggerate our progress and functionality to our customers and ourselves"

3: March 19, 1999

"For a demonstration [for El Paso County, Colorado] I suggest you fake it. Progam [sic] them both so they look the same, and then just do the upload fro [sic] the AV. That is what we did in the last AT/AV [AccuTouch/AccuVote] demo."

4: October 18, 2001

"Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. ... Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the .mdb file. ... It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to prevent Metamor [a consulting company] from opening it with Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. ... Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before."


Expert Analysis

Avi Rubin of Johns Hopkins University analyzes the stolen Diebold source code

His findings?

It would be easy for a Diebold insider to alter the system to affect votes

Since the code is "closed", it could be changed without detection



All voting machines use the same hard-coded password

Without a paper trail, there is no way to audit the system, & no way to reconstruct a disputed election

"Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We highlight several issues including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes."


Audit Logs

March 17, 2009

Justin Bales, Premier's Western Region manager, at a California state public hearing, admits the following about machines used in 34 states:

Audit log system does not record ballot deletions, even on election days

Flaws have been present over a decade



Clear button deletes the audit log without asking for confirmation from the user

Bales of Premier: "It was just not in the initial program, but now we're taking a serious look at that."

California Secretary of State on Diebold's audit logs: "Useless"

Keys

Ed Felten, Princeton: "The access panel door on a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine — the door that protects the memory card that stores the votes, and is the main barrier to the injection of a virus — can be opened with a standard key that is widely available on the Internet."



SHOPPING CART, ORDER FORM

O items in my cart | I

AccuMote-TS

Documentation & Help Cards

ExpressPoll 2000(4000 Networking & Printer Supplies

Office Furniture & Storage

Francter & Transport Cases DIMS-NoT/Voter Registration oting Booths & Ballot Boxes

ACCUVOTE-TS

The votes are in and Diebold supplies take the lead for accuracy and simplicity of use with this dependable touch-screen technology. //





Replacement Access Keys

 2 keys that allow easy service access to the Tally Printer and replacement battery compartment

> GS-567311-1000 \$5.90 USD per set \$6.90 CAD per set

Enter a quantity

add to your order. »

ORDER BY PHONE 800.769.3246

IS DIEBOLD THE DUMBEST COMPANY IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICA?

Screenshot from Diebold's online web store featuring a photo of the key used to open every one of their "secure", yet incredible hackable, electronic voting machines. Working copies were made from only the photo above and used to open a Diebold AccuVote TS system.

The BRAD BLOG | BradBlog.com

Problems

Expensive

DREs cost \$3,000-\$12,000

Most precincts need at least 5–10 DREs

Optical scanners cost \$4,000-\$10,000

Most precincts need 1 optical scanner

North Carolina study

Finding: 1 optical scanner does the work of 20 DREs

2008 cost analysis of Maryland's voting system

Finding: shifting from DREs to optical scanners reduces equipment costs by 80%

Calibration

EXAMINING TOUCHSCREEN
VOTE FLIPPING
Jackson County, West Virginia
Oct. 23, 2008



Jackson County, WV Clerk Jeff Waybright 2008 ES&S EXAMINING TOUCHSCREEN
VOTE FLIPPING
Jackson County, West Virginia
Oct. 23, 2008



Jackson County, WV Clerk Jeff Waybright 2008 ES&S

Hackability

From Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine:

"Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install ... malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines."


Dan S. Wallach, Associate Prof. of Computer Science, Rice University

"What we learned from the California Top-to-Bottom Review and the Ohio EVEREST study was that, indeed, these systems are unquestionably and unconscionably insecure." When machine boots, it checks to see if fboot.nb0 is on removable memory card

If it is, the machine replaces bootloader code on its on-board flash memory with new fboot.nb0

When machine boots, it checks to see if explorer.glb is on removable memory card

If it is, the machine runs explorer.glb without any authentication



Operating system used by Diebold voting machines?

Windows CE 3.0

Uniformity

Hundreds of thousands of copies of the same machines are in use across the USA

One problems means that elections across the country would be affected

Infrastructure

What if the electricity fails?

The Biggest Problem



Solutions

Better Security Procedures

In the Netherlands, after a voting foundation demonstrated security holes, the Dutch government ordered:

- » all software replaced
- » all hardware checked
- » unflashable firmware installed
- » iron seals placed on machines

Machines were checked randomly on election day

Paper ballots must always be available, enough for everyone to use if necessary

Voter-verified paper trails



Open Source

What's open source?


Secrecy does not mean security

Dan S. Wallach, Associate Prof. of Computer Science, Rice University


"Disclosing the source code only results in a complete forfeiture of the software's security if there was never any security there in the first place. ... If the product is well-engineered, then disclosing the software will cause no additional security problems. If the product is poorly-engineered, then the lack of disclosure only serves the purpose of delaying the inevitable."









"I'd like the paper ballot, please."



Google vote & any of these:

Bruce Schneier Edward Felten Avi Rubin





Thank you!

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Changelog

- **2016-05-16 1.1**: Added large section on George Caleb Bingham's *The County Election*
- 2014-04-10 1.0: Moved slides to new format & redid everything

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